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Executive Summary: How Has the 80th Percentile Rule Affected Alaska’s Health-Care Expenditures?
percentile rule was enacted. We then built a model to project how much 
spending would likely have increased in Alaska, without the rule. 
What DiD We FinD?
Figures 2 and 3 show different ways of estimating effects of the 80th 
percentile rule, for all health-care payers (private and public). Figure 2 
compares actual and estimated growth—without the rule—through an 
index, with 1991 as the benchmark. Figure 3 shows average annual growth 
from 2005-2014, and estimates percentages attributable to the rule.
• Without the rule, spending in 2014 would have been 4.9 times what it 
had been in 1991, while actual spending was 5.6 times  (Figure 2). That es-
timate of spending without the rule is based on our full sample, comparing 
Alaska with states that had similar pre-2004 spending growth.
• The average annual increase in spending from 2005 through 2014 was 
$376 million, and the rule accounted for anywhere from 8% to nearly 25% 
of that annual growth (Figure 3). We report a range of results, because the 
basis of comparison makes a difference. If we compare Alaska with states 
that had similar pre-2004 spending growth, about 22.5% of the annual 
increase can be attributed to the rule. But if we  instead compare Alaska 
growth just with that in other oil rich-states, the percentage drops to 9%, 
and if we eliminate the effects of the Affordable Care Act, the percentage 
increases to just under 25%. 
BackgrounD
In 2004, Alaska’s Division of Insurance adopted what’s known as the 80th 
percentile rule. That rule sets a minimum for how much health-insurance 
companies have to pay, when Alaskans with private insurance plans see 
doctors or other providers outside their insurers’ networks. 
The rule applies to all individual plans and to most private group plans.* 
The division established the rule after it got complaints from Alaskans 
who had insurance but faced unexpectedly large remaining bills, after 
their insurance companies had paid a share. 
The 80th percentile rule requires insurers to base their payments for out-
of-network claims on the amount at or above 80 percent of what all the 
providers charge for a specific service, in a given area of the state.  (This is 
not, as many Alaskans believe, a requirement that insurers pay 80% of the 
billed charges. The back page gives an example of how the rule works.)
Spending for health-care in Alaska increased from $1.5 billion in 1991 to $4.8 
billion in 2005 and $8.2 billion 
by 2014. Critics think the rule 
may be adding to that soaring 
spending, partly because  over 
time providers could increase 
their charges—and insurance 
payments would have to keep pace. 
The state Office of Management and Budget asked 
us to assess how the 80th percentile rule has 
affected Alaska’s overall health-care spending. Our 
analysis looks narrowly at just that potential effect 
of the rule. It’s important to say that we’re not tak-
ing any position on whether the state should keep, 
change, or repeal the rule. 
And remember that spending is not the same as 
cost. How much Alaskans spend for health care 
depends not only on how much they pay for ser-
vices, but also on how much they use those ser-
vices.  We don’t have broad information on costs, 
or on whether the 80th percentile rule has in fact 
reduced out-of-pocket costs 
for Alaskans seeing out-of-
network providers.
What DiD We Do?
We used federal data to 
compare Alaska health-care 
spending with that in  other 
states from 1991 to 2004, 
and identified a group of 
states with similar growth 
in spending before the 80th 
* It doesn’t apply to plans offered by firms that self-insure, which is most common among the largest employers.
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Figure 2. Growth of Personal Health-Care Spending by Alaskans, 1991-2014, Actual  
and Estimated Without 80th Percentile Rule, All Payers
(Indexed: 1991 Spending = 1) Actuala
Estimated, Without  Ruleb
5.59
4.87
1
aCenters for Medicare and Medicaid, Health Expenditures by State of Residence, 1991-2014
bAuthor’s estimate of growth in expenditures by all Alaska payers (private and public), based on results from a synthetic model—a model that estimates
 spending without the rule, using a combination of states where growth of health-care spending was similar to spending growth in Alaska from 1991 to 2004.
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Figure 3. How Much Did the 80th Percentile Rule Likely Contribute to Growth in Alaska Health-Care Spending?
Growth likely due to 80th percentile rule
aEstimated share of average annual increase attributable to the 80th percentile rule, for all health-care payers (private and public), based on comparing actual 
growth in spending with synthetic-model estimate of what spending would have been, without the 80th rule.
bSame as note a, except  comparing only with spending growth in other oil-rich states.     cSame as note a, except limiting period to 2005-2011.
dBased on data from Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, Health Expenditures by State of Residence, 1991-2014.
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Why Do More than one coMparison?
As we said earlier, our broad base for estimating 
effects of the 80th percentile rule is a comparison 
with states that had similar growth in health-
care spending before Alaska adopted the 80th 
percentile rule, including spending by all payers, 
private and public. 
But using that base alone doesn’t take into 
account other reasonable ways of estimating 
effects of the rule—so we made a range of esti-
mates, using somewhat different bases. 
In general, excluding spending by Medicare 
and Medicaid payers, and eliminating the 
years after the ACA went into effect, yield 
higher estimates of how much the rule added 
to the growth of health-care spending. Using 
changes in oil-rich states as a comparison pro-
duces a lower estimate.
What else is responsiBle For groWth?
Most of the growth in spending since 2005 
wasn’t due to the 80th percentile rule. That 
spending—in Alaska and across the U.S.—
has been rising fast since the 1990s.  The pace 
of growth was similar in Alaska and nationwide 
until the late 1990s, but after that spending in 
Alaska began growing faster. By 2014, spending in Alaska was 5.8 times 
what it had been in 1991; nationwide it was 3.8 times (Figure 4).
Analysts cite a number of reasons why health-care spending has climbed 
so much everywhere—including high prices for new procedures, tech-
nology, and drugs; inadequate management of widespread chronic dis-
eases; and high administrative costs.
In Alaska, health-care infrastructure—particularly doctor’s offices— 
has grown considerably (Figure 5). This increase in availability and va-
riety of facilities has made it easier for Alaskans to get care in-state, and 
it’s  safe to assume that increased availability translates into more use. 
conclusions     
We looked only at the aggregate increase in spending that likely resulted 
from the 80th percentile rule. Future work should focus on identifying how 
the rule affected health-care use  and out-of-pocket spending.
Also, before there can be an analysis of how the rule has affected prices 
in various parts of the health-care system, the necessary data has to be 
collected.
Explaining Alaska’s 80th Percentile Rule:  It Does Not Mean Insurers Have to Pay 80% of Billed Charges
The name “80th percentile rule” is confusing, because it leads people to think it requires health-insurers to pay 80% of whatever are determined to be customary 
rates for medical services. That’s not true. Here’s how it works:
• Say your hip is worn out. You go to a surgeon and have it replaced.
• You have health-insurance, but the surgeon who replaces your hip is outside your insurance network. Surgeons in your network have agreed to charge some specific 
amount for your new hip—but those outside the network set their own rates.
• Your out-of-network surgeon bills your insurance company, at a rate that may be more or less than other surgeons in your area charge to replace a hip.
• Under the 80th percentile rule, your insurance company has to base its payment on the billed amount that is at the 80th percentile of all the bills—that is, 80% 
of bills are below that amount, and 20% are above.
• The bill at the 80th percentile of all bills becomes the basis—called the allowed amount— for what insurance pays for your hip surgery. It pays whatever share 
of that allowed amount your policy calls for—in many cases, that’s 60% for out-of-network providers.    
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Figure 4. Growth in Health-Care Spending, Alaska and U.S., 1991-2014
(1991 Spending = 1)
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Figure 5. Growth in Number of Oces, Selected Alaska Health-Care Providers, 
1998 - 2015
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns
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Abstract
We use the Health Expenditures by State of Residence data (1991-2014) compiled by
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to examine the causal effect of the 80th
percentile rule on Alaska’s health care expenditures. We find evidence that Alaska’s
expenditures would have been lower in the absence of rule. The share of the overall
increase in expenditures that we attribute to the 80th percentile rule is between 8.61%
and 24.65%. It is important to note that using expenditures as a proxy for costs has
limitations as it is the product of both quantity of services used and prices.
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1 Summary
1.1 Main findings
Since 2004, Alaska has had a regulation known as the 80th percentile rule which applies
to all individual plans as well as fully-insured large and small group plans.1 As a result of
the regulation, when charges for out-of-network care are billed to insurers, the insurers are
required to pay an amount that is at least as much as the 80th percentile of billed charges for
that service in that geographical area. We evaluate the effect of this rule on Alaska’s health
care expenditures by relying on the State Health Expenditure Accounts (SHEA) estimated
by the Office of the Actuary (OACT) which are available from 1991 to 2014 by service, payer,
and state. During the period of our analysis, Alaska’s health expenditures grew, on average,
at 8.62% per year between 1991 and 2004 and at 6.15% between 2005 and 2014. We use a
statistical technique called the synthetic control method2 to assess how Alaska’s expenditures
would have evolved in the absence of the regulation. The method finds units -combination
of states- that mimic the growth of Alaska’s expenditures before 2004 and then evaluates
if any divergence between Alaska and the “synthetic” occurs after the intervention. Our
main analysis uses all payers3 and the full dataset (1991-2014). Table 1 presents a summary
of our results that contain Alaska’s actual average growth rates, the synthetic growth rates
which capture the evolution of expenditures in the absence of the rule, and the growth rate
differential between the actual and synthetic for each expenditure category for all the samples.
These different samples allow us to examine the sensitivity of our results. Below is a summary
findings:
• For the all payer sample which includes both private and government payers, we look at
the effect of the rule using three comparisons: the synthetic control made up of states
1It does not apply to self-insured plans, which is the preferred insurance approach for very large employers.
2The appendix includes technical and health expenditure definitions.
3 Private health insurance plans, large employer self-insured plans, uninsured patients, and Medicaid and
Medicare
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that best fit Alaska’s growth pattern, an analysis just from 2005-2011, to exclude any
increases attributable to the Affordable Care Act; and a comparison with just oil states,
which did not suffer as severe a recession as other states.4 we find the following:
– Alaska’s personal health care expenditures would have grown, on average, at be-
tween 0.58% and 1.78% percentage point less per year in the absence of the 80th
percentile rule depending on the sample. In other words, the 80th percentile rule
explains between 8.61% and 24.65%5 of the increases in expenditures the state has
experienced over the last decade. These results are statistically significant and
robust.
– The category for which we find the largest effect is Physician and Clinician services.
For this category, we find that the 80th percentile explains between 15% and 39%
of the growth rates. This means the yearly growth would have been between 1.06%
and 2.74% percentage point less per year in the absence of the 80th percentile rule.
• If we exclude government payers-Medicare and Medicaid-6, we find the following:
– Alaska’s personal health care expenditures would have grown, on average, at be-
tween 0.92% and 2.44% percentage point per year less in the absence of the 80th
percentile rule. In other words, the 80th percentile rule explains at between 12.97%
and 33.99% of the increases the state has experienced over the last decade. These
results are statistically significant and robust. It is important to note that this
subsample shows larger effects because Medicaid expenditures in Alaska, included
in the full sample, were growing slower in Alaska during the period of interest.
4The range of estimates stem from three different exercises. First, we find the best fit from all the rest of
country. Second, we restrict the analysis to 2011 to avoid any increases attributable to the ACA. Third, we
restrict the comparison group to just oil states which did not suffer as severe a recession as the rest of the
country.
5We calculate these shares by dividing the difference between the actual and synthetic by Alaska’s average
growth post the policy change.
6This sample removes government payers-Medicaid and Medicare- from the total spending by Alaskans.
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– For Physician and Clinician services, we find that the 80th percentile explains
between 18.69% and 52.14% of the growth rates. This means that we find Physician
and Clinician services would have grown at between 1.35% and 3.65% percentage
point less per year in the absence of the rule.
• There have also been significant changes in the Alaska health care market:
– We find that since the early 2000’s the Alaska healthcare market has grown consid-
erably. The number of Physician offices, for example, increased from 368 in 1998 to
569 in 2015. Those of physical therapists increased from 37 in 1998 to 134 in 2015.
This increase in availability and variety of healthcare facilities has made it easier
for Alaskans to obtain medical services. While we do not have data on usage rates,
it is safe to assume that added availability translates into additional consumption
of services, which influenced health care expenditures. In 2016, there were 264.32
physicians for every 100,000 Alaskans which is higher than the 240.21 per 100,000
in 2004. Even though the number of physicians has increased, the state still lags
the national average which has 291.98 per 100,000 Alaskans.
• Going forward it will be important to understand how the passage of the rule affected
consumers:
– This analysis focuses on the aggregate change in expenditures as a result of a
regulation change that was intended to lower the burden on Alaskan households.
– Future work should focus on identifying how the regulation impacted healthcare
usage and the extent to which it reduced out of pocket spending.
– Additionally, there should be an effort to obtain more detailed data sets that would
allow more precise analysis of how the regulation has affected healthcare prices of
specific subsets of the market.
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1.2 Limitations
Our analysis evaluates the effect of the 80th percentile rule on expenditures and not costs. It
has some other important limitations we list below:
• Expenditures are the product of prices and quantity of services used. In this analysis,
we can not disentangle usage from prices.
• The introduction of the rule might have resulted in higher usage by consumers, which
could explain a portion of the higher expenditures.
• We do not have data on charges or reimbursement levels which limits what we can say
about provider behavior after the rule was enacted.
• The rule was intended to reduce the consumer’s out of pocket portion of the expenditures
and we do not have a way to evaluate that.
• The data we use does not isolate the expenditures incurred simply by those who have
private insurance. This is an important limitation as this is the group most likely to feel
the effects of the rule change.
• Finally, and most importantly, this analysis does not make a recommendation regarding
the 80th percentile rule, since it only examines one aspect of the question.
1.3 Report Funding
ISER’s preparation of this report was supported with funding from the Office of Management
and Budget. The total budget was $31,250.
1.4 Study independence
As with all ISER research, this report and its conclusions are solely the work of the individual
authors and should be attributed to them, not to ISER, the University of Alaska Anchorage,
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Table 1: Summary of results
Personal
Health
Expen-
ditures
Hospital Physician
and
Clin-
ician
services
Other
prof
Dental
care
Home Nursing Drugs Durable Other
health
A) Alaska actual growth rates before the 80th percentile rule: 1991-2004
Full sample: All payers 8.62% 7.82% 9.26% 9.97% 6.89% 27.93% 7.68% 8.96% 6.48% 13.24%
Non Medicare/Medicaid 7.67% 6.92% 8.95% 9.68% 6.76% 20.40% 7.68% 7.42% 6.48% 10.36%
B) Alaska actual growth rates post 2004 with the 80th percentile rule
Full sample: All payers 6.73% 7.68% 7.03% 7.62% 5.24% 10.06% 3.27% 1.21% 4.96% 8.47%
All payers: 2005-2011 (Pre-ACA) 7.23% 8.67% 7.14% 7.54% 4.80% 12.89% 1.98% 1.89% 5.58% 9.06%
Non Medicare/Medicaid 7.06% 8.76% 7.21% 6.88% 4.13% 25.25% 3.27% 1.14% 4.96% 9.30%
C) Synthetic growth rates from 1991-2004
Full sample: All payers 8.76% 8.04% 8.88% 9.17% 7.02% 16.9% 18.10% 9.06% 6.46% 13.23%
Oil States 8.35% 6.82% 8.22% 9.04% 6.92% 17.44% 7.94% 9.08% 6.38% 12.75%
2005-2011 (Pre-ACA) 8.76% 8.04% 8.88% 9.17% 7.02% 16.9% 18.10% 9.06% 6.46% 13.23%
Non Medicare/Medicaid 7.68% 6.62% 8.42% 8.80% 6.91% 12.16% 8.54% 8.14% 10.14% 17.18%
D) Synthetic growth rates post 2004 in the absence of the 80th percentile rule
Full sample: All payers 5.07% 7.60% 4.10% 5.91% 3.36% 7.07% 6.60% 4.81% 4.36% 3.34%
Oil States: All payers 5.88% 7.67% 4.93% 6.48% 3.58% 7.01% 3.87% 4.50% 4.07% 6.01%
2005-2011 (Pre-ACA):All payers 5.31% 7.86% 4.01% 6.98% 3.89% 7.44% 7.65% 4.80% 4.71% 3.25%
Non Medicare/Medicaid 4.65% 8.27% 3.08% 5.02% 2.20% 6.73% 6.60% 3.08% 4.36% 3.86%
Growth rate differential between the actual and the synthetic: |B −D|-|A− C|
* Differences in bold are statistically significant
Full sample: All payers 1.52% -0.15% 2.56% 0.91% 1.74% -7.98% 2.47% 3.50% 0.58% 5.11%
Oil States: All payers 0.58% -0.99% 1.06% 0.21% 1.63% 7.44% 0.35% 3.16% 0.79% 1.96%
2005-2011 (Pre-ACA):All payers 1.78% 0.58% 2.74% -0.23% 1.04% -5.5% 4.8% 2.8% 0.9% 5.8%
Non Medicare/Medicaid 2.40% 0.19% 3.59% 0.99% 1.79% 10.28% 2.40% 1.21% 0.58% 5.22%
or the research sponsors. The funding agency did not influence the conclusions of the report.
We decided which dataset to analysze, methods to use, and how to wrtite our conclusions. In
our study design, analysis, and conclusions we are not advocating for maintaining, repealing,
or altering the current rule governing out-of network reimbursements. Our purpose is solely
to provide empirical analysis to advance the conversation.
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2 Introduction
Since 2004, Alaska has had a regulation known as the 80th percentile rule which applies
to all individual plans as well as fully-insured large and small group plans.7 As a result of
the regulation, when charges for out-of-network care are billed to insurers, the insurers are
required to pay an amount that is at least as much as the 80th percentile of billed charges
for that service in that geographical area. In theory, this provides transparency about how
reimbursements are paid and gives consumers protection. In fact, the 80th percentile rule
was implemented in 2004 as an effort to protect consumers given a string of complaints about
unexpected and large bills.
Over the last few years, it has been suggested in multiple media outlets and by health
analysts that the rule may be at least partially responsible for the cost increases in Alaska.
To date, however, there has not been any quantitative assessment linking the rule’s passage
to Alaska’s spiraling health costs. The Alaska Division of Insurance held multiple public
hearings in 2017 where both opponents and proponents presented their views on whether the
rule should be maintained, altered, or repealed.
The biggest concern regarding the rule is that providers can potentially increase their
charges over time, and insurance company reimbursements have to keep pace with the cost
increases. It may also be disincentive for providers to join insurance networks, and drives up
the cost of insurance.8
Our goal, in this paper, is to isolate the effect of the 80th percentile rule on Alaska’s
health care expenditures. This is clearly challenging given that we only observe the evolution of
Alaska’s health expenditures with the 80th percentile and do not know how these expenditures
7It does not apply to self-insured plans, which is the preferred insurance approach for very large employers.
8https://www.healthinsurance.org/alaska-state-health-insurance-exchange/rule
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would have been different in its absence. In order to solve this problem, we use information
from the rest of the U.S to construct what Alaska’s expenditures would have been in the
absence of the rule. We do this by identifying states or combination of states which evolved
in a similar manner to Alaska’s prior to the passage of the 80th percentile rule. This is a
data-driven strategy which attempts to find units or combination of units (states) which we
call the synthetic that mimic the evolution or growth rate of Alaska’s health expenditures
before the intervention by matching on both the outcome of interest (health expenditures)
and other characteristics. By doing that, whether health care spending for the actual Alaska,
which has experienced a law change and the synthetic Alaska which did not, diverge after
the law change. For example, the continuous line in Figure 2(a) is Alaska’s personal health
expenditures, and the dashed line is the synthetic which is constructed from a combination
of (0.154 of California/0.34 Maine/0.384 Nevada/ and 0.122 Vermont). This combination of
states is the one that best approximates the evolution of Alaska’s expenditures and therefore
minimizes pre-intervention differences. To simplify the matching and make the comparison
across states easier, we divide each year’s expenditure for each state by its level of spending
in 1991. This means that the ratio is 1 in 1991 for both the actual and synthetic and then we
track how yearly expenditures differ from the initial level. We note that there is an upward
trend pre-2004 in both markets but they track each other very closely. However, after 2004
the trajectories diverge, and Alaska’s growth rate is higher. Figure 2(b) shows the difference
between the actual and synthetic, and Figure 2(c) shows whether or not the divergence between
Alaska and its counterfactual are statistically significant or they simply happen as a result of
chance. To determine that, we assign the treatment (2004 intervention) to each US state and
develop a counterfactual case for each one of them. This allows us to determine how Alaska’s
divergence from its counterfactual post 2004 compares to that of every other unit. Therefore,
we can establish for each of the categories of interest whether the 80th percentile rule has
indeed resulted in a change in expenditures that can be causally attributed to the policy shift.
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Alaska’s gap is the one in bold and each other line represents the difference between the actual
and the synthetic for every other state.9
Our results indicate that expenditures would have been between 8.61% and 24.65% per
year in the absence of the rule. The category for which we find the most important change is
Physician and Clinician services where we attribute between 15% and 39% of the increases in
expenditures to the passage of the 80th percentile rule. In the next few sections, we lay out
the exact nature of the regulation, describe the health care cost challenge both nationally and
in Alaska, provide an overview of the data, present an overview of the methodology, discuss
our results, and then describe the Alaska health care market.
3 What does the regulation say?
3AAC 26.110(a) in the relevant part provides “a person that provides coverage in this state
for health care services or supplies on an expense incurred basis for which benefits are based
on an amount that is less than the actual amount billed for the health care services or supplies
shall...determine the final payment for a covered service or supply based on an amount that
...is equal to or greater than the 80th percentile of charges (based on a statistically credible
profile for each geographical area) for the health care services or supplies.”
4 Health care costs at the national level
Before delving into the Alaska health care market and the effect of the 80th percentile rule, we
first show how health care expenditures have evolved at the national level. Clearly, the high
and growing cost of health care is a significant issue for people, businesses, and governments as
spending on health care keeps growing as a share of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP).
In Table 2, we summarize some of the key statistics about the level and growth of health
9 A more technical explanation is provided in the methodology section.
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care expenditures in the U.S. The average yearly growth rate of health expenditures was 6%
between 1991 and 2014. During that same period, per capita personal income only grew
at 3.69%. The components of spending growing at the fastest rate were prescription drugs,
Other Health and Residential, and Home Health care which grew at 7.6%, 7.7% and 7.7%,
respectively. It is apparent from these figures that the high health care growth rates are not
just an Alaska issue but instead a national issue.
Table 2: Personal health expenditures in the United States in millions
Expenditure Category 1991 2014 Average annual growth rate
Hospital Care 275,768 980,966 5.7%
Physician and Clinician Services 175,750 597,137 5.5%
Other Professional Services 18,559 82,826 6.7%
Dental Services 33,397 112,832 5.4%
Home Health Care 15,135 83,566 7.7%
Prescription Drugs 67,628 354,784 7.5%
Durable Medical Products 13,081 46,622 5.7 %
Nursing Home Care 49,212 152,635 5.0%
Other Health, Residential, and Personal Care 27,365 151,456 7.7%
All categories 675,896 2,562,824 6%
5 Alaska’s Health Care Market
5.1 How much money is being spent on health care in Alaska?
All our analysis uses health expenditure estimates by state of residence, which reflect all
health care expenditures made by, or on behalf of, the residents of a state, regardless of
whether the care is provided in-state or out-of-state, and are useful for making comparisons
of per capita spending between states. These data are estimated by the Office of the Actuary
(OACT) and are an extension of the National Health Expenditure Accounts (NHEA). We
use these Health Accounts by State of residence to describe estimates of health care spending
by type of establishment delivering care (hospitals, physicians and clinics, nursing homes,
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etc.) and for medical products (prescription drugs, over-the-counter medicines and sundries
and durable medical products such as eyeglasses and hearing aids) purchased in retail outlets.
From Table 2, we can see that the total dollars spent on health care in 2014 was $8.151 billion.
The average yearly growth of expenditures was 7.8% with Other Professional Services, Other
health and residential services, and Physician and Clinician services experiencing the most
pronounced growth rates. Between 1991 and 2014, the average growth rate on personal health
care expenditures for Alaska was 7.8% which is second to Nevada that experienced an average
growth of 8.2%. Figure 1 shows that 73.07% (42.62% are in Hospital Care and 30.45% are in
Physician care) of the expenditures in 2014 are in Hospital and Physician care services with
the third largest category being for Other Health and Residential services. In 1991, the first
year for our data, Hospital care and Physican & Clinician services represented 70.9% of the
total, and the third largest category was Prescription drugs at 9.746%.
Figure 1: Distribution of Alaska’s Health Expenditures in 1991 and 2014
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9.746%
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3.775%
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Prescription Drugs
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Nursing Home Care
Physician & Clinical
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Distribution of Health 
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 by Type of Service in 1991
42.62%
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7.203%
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Table 3: Personal health expenditures in Alaska in millions
Expenditure Category 1991 2014 Average growth rate
Hospital Care 630 3,473 7.7%
Physician and Clinician Services 403 2,481 8.2%
Other Professional Services 49 324 8.8%
Dental Services 102 399 6.1%
Home Health Care 4 144 17%
Prescription Drugs 142 471 5.3%
Durable Medical Products 28 102 5.7 %
Nursing Home Care 44 150 5.5%
Other Health, Residential, and Personal Care 55 587 10.8%
All categories 1,458 8,151 7.8%
5.2 A note on the data
The State Health Expenditure Accounts (SHEA) is estimated at the Personal Health Care
(PHC) level. PHC is the component of total national health care spending that includes all
health care goods and services consumed and excludes administration and the net cost of
private health insurance, government public health activities, and investment in research and
structures & equipment. In the SHEA, total U.S. health spending for each type of service or
good is distributed among states using various nationally-available state level data sources.
In addition, state-by-state distributions of personal health care expenditures are developed
for Medicare, Medicaid, and private health insurance. The provider-based expenditures for
each service and for Medicare are converted to a state of residence basis using information on
health care expenditure patterns (or flows) between states.10
That is because some individuals cross state borders to receive health care services, health
care spending by provider location is not necessarily an accurate reflection of spending on
behalf of persons residing in that state.
10For detailed information on the conversion methodology, see Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
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5.3 How high are Alaska’s health care expenditures per capita?
Table 4 shows that Alaskans spent $11,000 dollars per person on healthcare in 2014. Of that,
$4,710 went toward hospital care, and another $3,360 dollars in physician and clinician care.
The third largest category of expenditure was Other health, residential, and personal care
which includes care at community centers or homes. Alaska’s health care expenditures per
capita are second only to the District of Columbia, where residents spent close to $12,000
per person. The state with the lowest personal expenditures per capita was Utah with only
$5,980 dollars per person. Utah’s expenditures per person were only 54% of those incurred
by Alaskans. Washington and Oregon, the two states most often compared to Alaska, had
expenditures per capita that were 71.5% and 72.7% of those of Alaskans.
6 Methodology
There are a number of advantages of using the synthetic control method (SCM) in this study.
First, in program evaluation, researchers often select comparisons on the basis of subjective
measures of similarity between the affected and the unaffected regions or states. But neither
the set of all U.S. states nor a single state likely approximates the most relevant characteristics
of Alaska (exposed unit). SCM, in contrast, provides a comparison state (or synthetic) that is a
combination of the control states— a data-driven procedure that calculates “optimal” weights
to be assigned to each state in the control group based on pre-intervention characteristics
— thus making explicit the relative contribution of each control unit to the counterfactual
of interest (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003 [1]; Abadie et al., 2010 [2]). SCM provides a
systematic way to choose comparison units where the researcher is forced to demonstrate the
affinities between the affected and unaffected units using observed characteristics (Abadie et
al., 2010 [2]; Abadie et al., 2015 [3]).
When aggregate data are employed (as is the case in this paper) the uncertainty remains
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Table 4: Per Capita Spending in thousands by category and state in 2014
Personal
Health
Expen-
ditures
Hospital Physician
and
Clin-
ician
services
Other
prof
Dental
care
Home Nursing Drugs Durable Other
health
State
Name
Alabama 7.28 2.62 1.73 0.170 0.279 0.202 0.39 1.407 0.141 3.24
Alaska 11.05 4.71 3.36 0.464 0.541 0.195 0.203 0.639 0.138 7.97
Arizona 6.451 2.33 1.77 0.247 0.334 0.135 0.286 0.813 0.174 3.47
Arkansas 7.408 2.67 1.63 0.261 0.309 0.181 0.439 1.16 0.103 6.35
California 7.548 2.75 1.98 0.216 0.376 0.290 0.382 0.954 0.096 4.95
Colorado 6.803 2.73 1.60 0.325 0.418 0.191 0.384 0.680 0.171 2.90
Connecticut 9.85 3.32 2.18 0.321 0.468 0.295 0.853 1.47 0.140 7.9
Delaware 10.25 4.07 2.25 0.348 0.409 0.239 0.607 1.52 0.196 5.91
D.C 11.94 5.23 2.45 0.223 0.409 0.652 0.582 1.16 0.115 10.98
Florida 8.07 2.73 2.19 0.300 0.329 0.293 0.489 1.23 0.252 2.54
Georgia 6.58 2.44 1.81 0.211 0.318 0.162 0.293 0.938 0.139 2.59
Hawaii 7.30 2.76 1.92 0.233 0.343 0.162 0.350 1.181 0.169 1.74
Idaho 6.92 3.03 1.32 0.301 0.389 0.178 0.365 0.796 0.149 3.83
Illinois 8.26 3.38 1.87 0.339 0.357 0.217 0.517 1.00 0.128 4.39
Indiana 8.30 3.49 1.84 0.241 0.328 0.162 0.580 1.11 0.164 3.72
Iowa 8.20 3.29 1.55 0.261 0.351 0.176 0.662 1.14 0.139 6.16
Kansas 7.65 2.96 1.70 0.266 0.352 0.137 0.566 1.11 0.125 4.17
Kentucky 8.00 3.21 1.83 0.228 0.267 0.159 0.476 1.19 0.148 4.77
Louisiana 7.81 3.04 1.71 0.237 0.290 0.283 0.398 1.25 0.101 4.79
Maine 9.52 3.95 1.68 0.329 0.376 0.202 0.589 1.15 0.137 11.00
Maryland 8.60 3.28 2.11 0.275 0.371 0.176 0.626 1.14 0.125 4.82
Massachusetts 10.55 3.93 2.26 0.301 0.480 0.667 0.72 1.24 0.170 7.74
Michigan 8.05 3.25 1.73 0.264 0.378 0.288 0.477 1.10 0.273 2.73
Minnesota 8.87 3.37 1.75 0.269 0.403 0.524 0.584 0.954 0.134 8.67
Mississippi 7.64 3.22 1.56 0.189 0.253 0.212 0.449 1.13 0.164 4.52
Missouri 8.10 3.49 1.54 0.227 0.294 0.226 0.530 1.27 0.106 4.13
Montana 8.21 3.72 1.65 0.303 0.387 0.151 0.421 0.865 0.165 5.46
Nebraska 8.41 3.49 1.75 0.296 0.325 0.096 0.604 1.24 0.185 4.12
Nevada 6.71 2.37 1.87 0.272 0.349 0.233 0.250 0.965 0.150 2.44
New Hampshire 9.58 3.79 2.22 0.262 0.532 0.227 0.583 1.22 0.191 5.71
New Jersey 8.85 2.91 2.36 0.361 0.412 0.244 0.565 1.35 0.158 4.78
New Mexico 7.21 3.16 1.59 0.267 0.347 0.250 0.282 0.747 0.206 3.54
New York 9.77 3.63 1.87 0.298 0.361 0.487 0.618 1.43 0.143 9.36
North Carolina 7.26 2.77 1.61 0.221 0.357 0.195 0.452 1.237 0.142 2.67
North Dakota 9.85 4.47 1.71 0.260 0.429 0.072 0.744 1.17 0.164 8.11
Ohio 8.71 3.80 1.77 0.232 0.317 0.259 0.605 1.02 0.143 5.42
Oklahoma 7.62 3.11 1.65 0.259 0.341 0.194 0.407 1.18 0.115 3.59
Oregon 8.04 2.94 1.87 0.330 0.456 0.166 0.467 0.882 0.129 7.93
Pennsylvania 9.25 3.41 1.96 0.308 0.315 0.244 0.774 1.345 0.141 7.47
Rhode Island 9.55 3.61 1.85 0.311 0.335 0.252 0.742 1.41 0.137 8.88
South Carolina 7.31 2.93 1.61 0.204 0.318 0.218 0.382 1.19 0.154 2.88
South Dakota 8.92 4.41 1.63 0.255 0.416 0.092 0.573 0.948 0.126 4.68
Tennessee 7.37 2.61 1.87 0.218 0.286 0.214 0.413 1.21 0.135 3.91
Texas 6.99 2.69 1.69 0.207 0.288 0.282 0.305 1.07 0.115 3.33
Utah 5.98 2.35 1.31 0.212 0.376 0.187 0.229 0.783 0.160 3.61
Vermont 10.18 4.66 1.74 0.320 0.462 0.301 0.562 1.15 0.129 8.37
Virginia 7.55 2.91 1.87 0.224 0.382 0.152 0.437 1.01 0.135 4.20
Washington 7.91 3.09 2.06 0.323 0.497 0.187 0.461 0.795 0.146 3.46
West Virginia 9.45 4.03 1.80 0.237 0.296 0.272 0.538 1.37 0.185 7.10
Wisconsin 8.70 3.50 2.16 0.263 0.396 0.230 0.552 1.10 0.124 3.63
Wyoming 8.31 3.99 1.77 0.376 0.412 0.077 0.385 0.75 0.128 4.16
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about the ability of the control group to reproduce the counterfactual outcomes that the af-
fected unit would have exhibited in the absence of the intervention. This type of uncertainty is
not reflected by the standard errors constructed with the traditional inferential techniques for
comparative case studies. As Buchmueller et al. (2011) explain, in a “clustering” framework,
inference is based on asymptotic assumptions that do not apply in our case as our focus is
one state at a time.
Additionally, Abadie et al. (2010) argue that unlike the traditional regression-based
difference-in-difference model that restricts the effects of the unobservable confounders to
be time-invariant so that they can be eliminated by taking time differences, SCM allows the
effects of such unobservables to vary with time. In particular, Abadie et al. (2010)[2] show
that with a long pre-intervention matching on outcomes and characteristics a synthetic control
also matches on time-varying unobservables.11
Finally, because the construction of a synthetic control does not require access to post
intervention outcomes, SCM allows us to decide on a study design without knowing its bearing
on its findings (Abadie et al., 2010[2]). The ability to make decisions on research design while
remaining blind to how each particular decision affects the conclusions of the study is a
safeguard against actions motivated by a “desired” finding (Rubin, 2001)[4].
To obtain the synthetic control we follow Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003)[1] and Abadie et
al. (2010)[2]. For states i = 1, ..., J + 1 and periods t = 1, ..., T suppose state i = 1 is exposed
to the intervention (the 80th percentile rule) at time t∗ ∈ (1, T ). The observed outcome for
any state i at time t is
Yi,t = Y
N
it + αitSit, (1)
11As Abadie et al. put it, “...only units that are alike in both observed and unobserved determinants of the
outcome variable as well as in the effect of those determinants on the outcome variable as well as in the effect
of those determinants on the outcome variable should produce similar trajectories of the outcome variable
over extended periods time.”
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where Y Nit is the outcome for state i at time t in the absence of the intervention, the binary
indicator variable, Sit, denotes the intervention taking the value of 1 if i = 1 and t > t
∗, and
αit, the coefficient to be estimated, is the effect of the intervention for state i at time t.
Under standard conditions, there exists W∗ = (w∗2, ..., w∗J+t)′ such that pre-intervention
matching is achieved with respect to the outcome variable as well as characteristics (or pre-
dictors), and we can use
αˆ1t = Y1t −
J+1∑
j=2
w∗jYjt, t ∈ T0 + 1, ..., T , (2)
as an estimator for α1t. The term
∑J+1
j=2 w
∗
jYjt on the right-hand-side of (2) is simply the
weighted average of the observed outcome of the control states for t ∈ To + 1, ..., T with
weights W∗. The optimal weights placed on each unit are found by minimizing
(X1 −X0W )′V (X1 −X0W ), (3)
where X1 is a k × 1) vector of pre-event predictors for the treatment state (Alaska), X0 is a
(K × J) matrix of pre-event predictors for the control group of states, and W is a (J × 1)
vector of weights that are assigned to controls in the donor pool that sum to one. Finally, V
is a (K ×K) diagonal matrix, where the diagonal elements describe the importance of each
predictor.
6.1 Inference
Once an optimal weighting vector W* is chosen, the “synthetic” is obtained by calculating the
weighted average of the donor pool. The post-intervention values of the synthetic control serve
as our counterfactual outcome for the treatment state. The post-intervention gap between the
actual outcome and the synthetic outcome, therefore, captures the impact of the intervention.
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To begin, we follow Bohn et al. (2014)[5] and calculate a difference-in-difference estimate for
the treatment state,
∆TR = |Y postTR,actual − Y postTR,synthetic| − |Y preTR,actual − Y preTR,synthetic| (4)
Where Y
post
TR,actual is the average of the post-intervention actual outcome of the treatment
state,Y
post
TR,synthetic is the average of the post-intervention outcome of the counterfactual. Sim-
ilarly, Y
pre
TR,actual is the average of the pre-intervention actual outcome of the treatment state,
and the Y
pre
TR,synthetic is the average of the pre-intervention outcome of the counterfactual. If
the outcome changed in response to the intervention in time T0 we would expect ∆TR>0.
Taking the absolute values in Eq.(4) makes sure that the estimate is neutral to the direction
of change.
7 Sample definitions
• We describe the different samples that we analyze and the rationale for including them
before discussing each spending category individually. In each of these samples, we find
the best matches for Alaska’s expenditures and re-conduct the analysis to determine the
sensitivity of our results. The different samples are the following:
– All payers: the full sample which includes all payers and uses all the data from
1991 to 2014. These results can be found in Table 5.
– Oil states: The great recession between 2007 and 2009 was very severe and affected
government, household, and business expenditures. This decline in economic ac-
tivity has the potential of reducing health expenditures. Therefore, it is possible
that some of the effect we are estimating in the full sample is due to a slowdown
in spending in the states that experienced housing recessions. To address these
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concerns, we analyze a subsample that restrict the donor pool to states whose
economies depend on oil. These states were much more resilient to the decline in
economic activity during the great recession and have an industrial structure that
is much more similar to that of Alaska.Table 6 shows the results for this sample.
– Affordable Care Act: In addition to the great recession, the Affordable Care Act
could have resulted in an uneven increase in expenditures and could at least par-
tially explain the deviation between the actual and synthetic we observe when using
the full sample that extends to 2014. To address this concern, in Table 7 we re-
strict our analysis to 2011 which allows us to eliminate the period of time after the
passage of the ACA.
– Only Government payers: An additional concern could be that we are not capturing
the effect of the 80th percentile rule but some other change that occurred in Alaska.
To address that question, we evaluate just government payers who are not affected
by the rule change implemented in 2004. In theory, the 80th percentile had no
direct effect on payments by government payers and therefore should not influence
these categories. Table 8 and Table 9 show the results for Medicare and Medicaid
separately.
– Non Medicare/Medicaid: in Table 10, we remove Medicaid and Medicare expendi-
tures from the analysis and re-develop a synthetic for Alaska’s expenditures exclud-
ing these payers. Ideally, we would have had private payers separately but unfor-
tunately that series is only available from 2001-2014 which that does not represent
a long enough pre-intervention period for us to develop a proper counterfactual.
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8 Results
8.1 Summary
In this section, we lay out the structure of our analysis before we discuss the different outcome
variables and subsamples in detail in the subsections below. The full sample uses both the
combined health care expenditure categories (Personal health expenditures) as well as the
subcategories 12 and uses the rest of the country (49 states plus D.C) as the donor pool.13
These results are presented in figures 2 to 11 and Tables 5 to 9. The figures show the impact
of the 2004 intervention on personal health care expenditures, hospital care, physician and
clinician services, other professional services, dental care, home care, nursing expenditures,
prescription drugs, durable goods, and other health expenditures.14 Each figure labeled A
shows the actual and synthetic outcome, the ones labeled B show the difference between the
actual and synthetic, and the ones labeled C show placebos of all the states with Alaska always
in black bold. Table 4 contains the weights that the donor states contribute in the construction
of the synthetic control for each of the variables of interest for the full sample. Table 5 presents
the main statistical results for the full sample along with the permutations or randomization
tests. These randomizations tests rank how the gap in the post- and pre-intervention mean
differences between actual and synthetic outcomes of the treatment unit (Alaska) and compare
them to those from the placebo runs for each of the donors (rest of the U.S). In Table 6, we
present summary results when we restrict the donor pool to just states whose economies are
driven by a reliance on oil. We rely on Snead(2009)[6] who identifies a group of 13 states
who clearly outperformed non-energy states during the depth of the recession. Therefore,
12Hospital care, Physician and clinician services, Other professional services, Dental care, Home care, Nurs-
ing, and Prescription drugs
13Donor pool means all the states that are considered when constructing the synthetic or counterfactual.
14All variables are converted to base ratios. A base ratio in our case is defined as the expenditure in a given
category divided by the level of spending in the first year of data which happens to be 1991. This allows us to
measure the level of spending in any given year relative to the baseline. It also is an easy way to think about
the growth of spending and makes the matching procedure, construction of a counterfactual, easier.
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this group of states are less likely to have experienced severe income shocks during the great
recession between 2007-2009 that could explain lower healthcare spending levels. Table 7
shows the results when we restrict the time period to 2011 to avoid any shocks stemming from
the encatment of the Affordable Care Act. In Table 8 and Table 9, we examine if the changes
we are capturing in the all payer analysis could be driven by government payers. We isolate
Medicaid and Medicare and assess if expenditures in those categories evolved differently than
the rest of the country post-2004. Finally, in Table 10, we subtract the two government payers
from the full sample and analyze the Non-Medicaid/Non-Medicare sample separately.
8.2 All health expenditures
This outcome includes all health expenditures by Alaska residents. It consists of payments
to hospitals, physicians, other professional services, dental care, prescription drugs, home
care, nursing homes, prescription drugs, durable goods, and other health expenditures. From
Table 5, column 1, we see that that the gap pre intervention (D1)15 was -0.14% which means
that we achieve a good pre-intervention match, and the post intervention difference (D2)16
is 1.66%. The gap between D2 and D1 tells us that Alaska’s personal health expenditures
would have been 1.52% lower in the absence of the rule. Graphically, Figure 2(a) shows
Alaska’s -the continuous line- expenditures relative to 1991 and those of the -dashed line-
counterfactual. It is important to note that both lines are equal to 1 in 1991 and that the
counterfactual tracks Alaska’s growth very closely. We see, however, a divergence after the
passage of the regulation. Figure 2(b) is the difference between the two lines in Figure 2(a)
and makes it clear that the Alaska’s growth rate diverges post 2004. Figure 2(c) shows the
gap between the actual and synthetic in Alaska (thick black line) relative to the gap in the
other donor units. From this graph, Alaska’s effect is considerably more pronounced than the
others. From Table 6, we see that the results are still statistically significant but are much
15D1 is the difference in means from 1991 and 2004 between the actual and the synthetic
16D2 is the difference in means from 2005 and 2014 between the actual and the synthetic
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smaller in magnitude when we compare Alaska to just oil states. For this sample, we can
only attribute about 0.58% of the yearly increases to the rule’s introduction. Table 8 and
Table 9 show that these differences we capture are not driven by Medicaid and Medicare. For
Medicare, we find no statistical differences between Alaska and its synthetic, and for Medicaid
we find that Alaska’s expenditures grew slower. In Table 10, we show that the results from
the Non-Medicare/Medicaid sample are larger than the ones obtained than we have all payers
in the sample.
8.3 Hospital Care
Hospital Care (NAICS 622) reflects spending for all services that are provided to patients
and that are billed by the hospital. From Table 5, column 2, we see that that the gap pre
intervention (D1) was -0.23% which means that we achieve a good pre-intervention match,
and the post intervention difference (D2) is 0.07%. The gap between D2 and D1 tells us that
Alaska’s personal health expenditures would have been -0.15% lower in the absence of the rule
but is not statistically significant as it is ranked 17th out of the 51 units. Figure 3(c) shows
the gap between the actual and synthetic in Alaska (thick black line) relative to the gap in the
other donor units. From this figure, Alaska’s effect is not more pronounced than the others.
From Table 6, we find that when we compare Alaska to just oil states, we find that Alaska’s
expenditures actually grew slower. Table 8 and Table 9 show that the differences we capture
are not driven by Medicaid and Medicare as none of the results are statistically significant.
In Table 10, we show that the results from the Non-Medicare/Medicaid sample are weakly
significant and small in magnitude.
8.4 Physician and clinician services
Physician and Clinical Services include expenditures for services provided in establishments
operated by Doctors of Medicine (M.D.) and Doctors of Osteopathy (D.O.), outpatient care
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centers, plus the portion of medical laboratories services that are billed independently by the
laboratories. From Table 5, column 3, we see that that the gap pre-intervention (D1) was
0.38% which means that we achieve a good pre-intervention match, and the post intervention
difference (D2) is 2.94%. The gap between D2 and D1 tells us that Alaska’s physician and clin-
ician services would have been 2.56% lower in the absence of the rule. Graphically, Figure 4(a)
shows Alaska’s -the continuous line- expenditures relative to 1991 and those of the -dashed
line- counterfactual. We see that the counterfactual tracks Alaska’s growth very closely before
the rule change. After 2004, we see there is a divergence after the passage of the law which
continues growing over time. Figure 4(b) is the difference between the two lines in Figure 4(a)
and makes it clear that the Alaska’s growth rate diverges post 2004. Figure 4(c) shows the
gap between the actual and synthetic in Alaska (thick black line) relative to the gap in the
other donor units. From this graph, Alaska’s effect is considerably more pronounced than the
others. From Table 6, column 3, we see that the results are still statistically significant but
smaller in magnitude when we compare Alaska to just oil states. For this sample, we can only
attribute about 1.06% of the yearly healthcare growth increases to the rule’s introduction.
Table 8 and Table 9 show that the differences we capture are not driven by Medicaid and
Medicare. For Medicare, we find no statistical differences between Alaska and its synthetic,
and for Medicaid we find that Alaska’s expenditures grew slower. In Table 10, we show that
the results from the Non-Medicare/Medicaid sample are larger than the ones obtained when
we have all payers in the sample.
8.5 Other professional services
Other Professional Services include expenditures for services provided in establishments op-
erated by health practitioners other than physicians and dentists. These professional services
include those provided by private-duty nurses, chiropractors, podiatrists, optometrists, and
physical, occupational and speech therapists, among others. We find mixed evidence for this
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category of spending as the size of the effect and the statistical significance vary considerably
across samples.
8.6 Dental care
Dental Services include expenditures for services provided in establishments operated by a
Doctor of Dental Medicine (D.M.D.), Doctor of Dental Surgery (D.D.S.), or Doctor of Dental
Science (D.D.Sc.). These establishments are classified as NAICS 6212-Offices of Dentists.
Figure 6(a) shows that we achieve a good fit with the counterfactual tracking Alaska very
closely. It is also clear that the divergence happens much later than 2004. Figure 6(c) shows
the gap between the actual and synthetic Alaska (thick black line) relative to the gap in the
other donor units. From this graph, Alaska’s effect does not appear to be more pronounced
than the others. In Table 2, column 5, we see that it is ranked 15th out of the 51 units in
terms of magnitude and is therefore not significant.
8.7 Home care
Home Health Care services include expenditures for medical care services provided in the
home by freestanding home health agencies (HHAs) that are classified in NAICS 6216-Home
Health Care Services. In this category as we can see in Figure 7(a-c), the match between
Alaska and its synthetic is imperfect. In particular, we see Alaska expenditures diverging
from the synthetic in Figure 7(a) well before the rule change. Also, the Alaska series is very
noisy with non-negligible fluctuations. The bad match coupled with the significant volatility
makes interpreting the effect of the rule problematic.
8.8 Nursing
The nursing category includes expenditures for Nursing Care Facilities and Continuing Care
Retirement Communities include spending for inpatient nursing care services, rehabilitative
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services, and continuous personal care services to persons requiring nursing care that are pro-
vided in freestanding nursing home facilities. We see from Figure 8(a-b) that Alaska’s nursing
expenditures grow more slowly than the synthetic but similar to the home care expenditure
category, the divergence happens before the rule change. We do not attribute this difference
in spending to the passage of the 80th rule as it is likely due to demographic factors.
8.9 Prescription drugs
Prescription Drugs include expenditures for the “retail” sales of human-use dosage-form drugs,
biological drugs, and diagnostic products that are available only by a prescription. Other
Non-Durable Medical Products include expenditures for the “retail” sales of non-prescription
drugs and medical sundries. Figure 9(a) shows Alaska’s -the continuous line- and those of
the -dashed line- counterfactual. We see that the counterfactual tracks Alaska’s growth very
closely before the rule change. After 2004, we see there is a divergence after the passage of the
law. The prescription drug growth expenditures in Alaska is much lower than the prescription
growth rate in the counterfactual. The differences between Alaska and the counterfactual are
significant in all subsamples except the Non-Medicaid/Medicare payers. The results we find
could be due to the passage of Medicare part D which went into effect in 2006.17 This law
change could explain the faster growth in the rest of the states that have a much higher share
of people over the age of 65. We do not believe these differences in spending levels post 2004
are due the passage of the 80th percentile rule.
17Medicare Part D is a voluntary outpatient prescription drug benefit for people on Medicare that went into
effect in 2006. All 59 million people on Medicare, including those ages 65 and older and those under age 65
with permanent disabilities, have access to the Part D drug benefit through private plans approved by the
federal government
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8.10 Durable goods
Durable Medical Products include expenditures for the “retail” sales of items such as contact
lenses, eyeglasses and other ophthalmic products, surgical and orthopedic products, hearing
aids, wheelchairs, and medical equipment rentals. Figure 10(a) shows that we achieve a good
fit with the counterfactual tracking Alaska very closely. Figure 10(c) shows the gap between
the actual and synthetic Alaska (thick black line) relative to the gap in the other donor units.
From this graph, Alaska’s effect does not appear to be more pronounced than the others. In
Table 2, column 9, we see that it is ranked 23rd out of the 51 units in terms of magnitude
and is therefore not significant.
8.11 Other Health
Other Health, Residential, and Personal Care services include those for care provided in resi-
dential care facilities, ambulance services, and for services provided in non-traditional settings.
From Table 5, column 10, we see that that the gap pre intervention (D1) was 0.01% which
means that we achieve a good pre-intervention match, and the post intervention difference
(D2) is 5.13%. The gap between D2 and D1 tells us that Other Health Expenditures would
have been 5.11% lower in the absence of the rule. Graphically, Figure 11(a) shows Alaska’s
-the continuous line- and the -dashed line- counterfactual. We see that the counterfactual
tracks Alaska’s growth very closely before the rule change. After 2004, we see there is a di-
vergence after the passage of the law which continues growing over time. Figure 11(b) is the
difference between the two lines in Figure 11(a) and makes it clear that the Alaska’s growth
rate diverges post 2004. Figure 11(c) shows the gap between the actual and synthetic in Alaska
(thick black line) relative to the gap in the other donor units. From this figure, Alaska’s effect
is considerably more pronounced than the others.
From Table 6, column 10, we see that the results are still statistically significant but
smaller in magnitude when we compare to just oil states. In this sample, we can only attribute
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about 1.96% of the yearly healthcare growth increases to the rule’s introduction. Table 8 and
Table 9 show that these differences we capture are not driven by Medicaid and Medicare. In
Table 10, we show that the results from the Non-Medicare/Medicaid sample are about the
same magnitude as the ones obtained when we have all payers in the sample but are not
statistically significant.
All the analysis we provide above is based on expenditures which are a product of both
prices and quantity of services obtained. To showcase the role of availability, we provide
descriptive statistics showing how the healthcare market has grown, and how the health of
Alaskans has changed over the last two decades.
9 How has the health care market changed since the
implementation of the 80th percentile rule?
In order to provide context to our results, we describe how the Alaska health care market
has evolved.18 We show in Figure 12 that Alaska has considerably more physicians, and more
doctor offices than it did in the early 2000’s. The number of Physician offices, for example,
increased from 368 in 1998 to 569 in 2015. Those of physical therapists increased from 37
in 1998 to 134 in 2015. This increase in availability and variety of healthcare facilities has
made it easier for Alaskans to obtain medical services. While we do not observe usage rates,
it is safe to assume that added availability translates into additional consumption of services
which influences health care expenditures. In 2016, there were 264.32 physicians for every
100,000 Alaskans which is higher than the 240.21 per 100,000 in 2004.19 We also note in
the table below that the share of primary doctors has decreased over time. Even though the
number of physicians has increased, the state still lags the national average which has 291.98
per 100,000. In the next section, we show how the health of Alaskans has changed over the
18This information is from County Business Patterns which classifies businesses based on NAICS codes.
19 This data is compiled from the Alaska Physican Worforce Profiles available online.
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last two decades.
Snapshot of Alaska’s physician workforce over time
Year All specialties Primary care Primary care share Alaska population Physician per 100,000
2004 1,580 732 46.33% 657,755 240.21
2012 1,813 750 41.37% 731,449 247.86
2014 1,883 772 41.00% 736,732 255.59
2016 1,961 806 41.10% 741,894 264.32
10 Are Alaskans Healthier?
We use Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) to examine how the health of
Alaskans evolved over the last two decades. The table below shows that the share of Alaskans
who think of themselves in Good Health or better went from 87.07% in 1995 to 84.78% in
2010. There does not appear to be a strong relationship between the self-assessment of health
and the size of the healthcare market during this period. Of course, there are dimensions of
welfare which could have improved due to the better access and availability stemming from the
larger market. Also, we are not measuring the counterfactual of how the health of Alaksans
would have changed if the market had remained small. It is not clear how much delay of care
was occuring before the expansion of the market and if individuals were foregoing procedure
for fear of large out of pocket bills.
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How healthy are Alaskans?
Excellent Very
Good
Good Fair Poor
Year
1995 25.02 35.67 26.38 7.48 3.09
1996 24.75 35.63 28.03 6.34 3.66
1997 26.82 31.03 27.82 9.74 3.0
1998 25.44 31.64 29.67 9.16 3.83
1999 21.24 34.47 28.58 9.20 2.86
2000 23.01 32.15 31.21 7.57 4.45
2001 23.53 32.52 29.14 8.97 4.39
2002 22.17 30.95 30.50 9.95 5.43
2003 22.83 31.54 31.32 8.71 5.05
2004 19.72 34.35 31.16 9.85 4.43
2005 21.34 31.18 31.36 9.61 5.30
2006 19.73 35.85 29.68 9.06 5.22
2007 20.56 31.35 30.27 10.05 5.39
2008 18.32 34.62 30.10 11.04 4.58
2009 19.2 35.31 31.35 9.60 3.76
2010 18.92 34.11 31.75 8.44 4.1
11 Conclusion
We analyze the effect of the 80th percentile on Alaska’s health expenditures. We find Alaska’s
health care expenditures are between 8.61 and 24.65% higher as result of the 80th percentile
rule. These increases represent a combination of higher prices and increased usage from the
improved access and richness of the healthcare market. The category of expenditures for which
we find the most consistent increases is Physician and Clinician services. For this category,
we find that the 80th percentile explains between 15% and 39% of the growth rates. This
means the yearly growth would have been between 1.06% and 2.74% lower in the absence of
the 80th percentile rule. We find no evidence that hospital expenditures would have evolved
differently in the absence of the reimbursement rule.
These findings have significant limitations as the data does not allow us to address the
extent to which the regulation has reduced the out-of pocket burden for households. Addi-
tionally, we are not able to conduct specialty specific analysis, and are unable to quantify the
extent to which the higher expenditure are due to higher prices or higher usage and therefore
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it is best to think about our estimates as upper bounds given that spending is the product of
prices of and quantity consumed.
They do, however, provide us with the first quantification of how the introduction of the
80th percentile rule has changed health spending in Alaska. They also make it clear that while
a tremendous amount of attention has been reserved to the 80th percentile rule, it is far from
the only source of health care cost increases. In fact our results show that even in the absence
of the rule, health care expenditures would have grown at between 4.95% and 6.15% a year
which is as high as Alaska’s GDP growth which has averaged 5.4% between 2004 and 2014.
Recent growth rates of GDP are considerably smaller as a result of the decrease in oil prices.
The study also points to the perils of simple comparisons of neighboring states’ health
expenditures as none of the states that produced the best matches in our analysis are the
ones typically used when conducting comparisons. The synthetic control method allows us
to construct comparison units that are more -similar to the treatment states, particularly in
terms of pre-treatment outcomes.
Future work should focus on disentangling how the introduction of the 80th percentile rule
has affected usage and prices. Specifically, there should be an emphasis on identifying the
specialties or segments of the market with the highest out-of network participants and how
those have evolved relative to the rest of the market. It would also be important to understand
how the 80th percentile has benefited consumers, and assisted in the growth of the healthcare
market.
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Personal Health Expenditures: Personal health care (PHC) by State of Residence are based on State of Provider estimates adjusted for the flow
of residents between states in order to consume health care services. These estimates present health spending on behalf of residents in the 50 States
and in the District of Columbia.
Figure 2a: Actual and synthetic Personal Health Care Expenditures
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Figure 2b: Actual minus synthetic Personal Health Care Expenditures
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Figure 2c: Placebos Personal Health Care Expenditures
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Hospital Care Hospital Care (NAICS 622) reflects spending for all services that are provided to patients and that are billed by the hospital.
Figure 3a: Actual and synthetic in Hospital care
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Figure 3b: Actual minus synthetic in Hospital Care
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Figure 3c: Placebos in Hospital Care
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Physician and clinician services: Physician and Clinical Services include expenditures for services provided in establishments operated by
Doctors of Medicine (M.D.) and Doctors of Osteopathy (D.O.), outpatient care centers, plus the portion of medical laboratories services that are
billed independently by the laboratories.
Figure 4a: Actual and synthetic physician and clinician services
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Figure 4b: Actual minus synthetic physician and clinician services
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Figure 4c: Placebos physician and clinician services
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Other professional services: Other Professional Services include expenditures for services provided in establishments operated by health prac-
titioners other than physicians and dentists. These professional services include those provided by private-duty nurses, chiropractors, podiatrists,
optometrists, and physical, occupational and speech therapists, among others. These establishments are classified in NAICS 6213-Offices of Other
Health Practitioners.
: Figure 5a: Actual and synthetic other professional services
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: Figure 5b: Actual minus synthetic other professional services
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: Figure 5c: Placebos other professional services
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Dental Care Dental Services include expenditures for services provided in establishments operated by a Doctor of Dental Medicine (D.M.D.), Doctor
of Dental Surgery (D.D.S.), or Doctor of Dental Science (D.D.Sc.). These establishments are classified as NAICS 6212-Offices of Dentists.
: Figure 6a: Actual and synthetic dental care
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: Figure 6b: Actual minus synthetic dental care
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: Figure 6c: Placebos dental care
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Home Care Home Health Care services include expenditures for medical care services provided in the home by freestanding home health agencies
(HHAs) that are classified in NAICS 6216-Home Health Care Services.
: Figure 7a: Actual and synthetic home care
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: Figure 7b: Actual minus synthetic home care
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Figure 7c: Placebos home care
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Nursing: Expenditures for Nursing Care Facilities and Continuing Care Retirement Communities include spending for inpatient nursing care services,
rehabilitative services, and continuous personal care services to persons requiring nursing care that are provided in freestanding nursing home facilities.
Figure 8a:Actual and synthetic nursing
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Figure 8b: Actual minus synthetic nursing
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Figure 8c: Placebos nursing
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Prescription drugs: Prescription Drugs include expenditures for the “retail” sales of human-use dosage-form drugs, biological drugs, and diagnostic
products that are available only by a prescription. Other Non-Durable Medical Products include expenditures for the “retail” sales of non-prescription
drugs and medical sundries.
Figure 9a: Actual and synthetic drugs
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Figure 9b: Actual minus synthetic drugs
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Figure 9c: Placebos drugs
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Durable:Durable Medical Products include expenditures for the “retail” sales of items such as contact lenses, eyeglasses and other ophthalmic
products, surgical and orthopedic products, hearing aids, wheelchairs, and medical equipment rentals.
Figure 10a: Actual and synthetic durable
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Figure 10b: Actual minus synthetic durable
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Figure 10c: Placebos durable
-1
0
1
2
G
ap
 in
 d
ur
ab
le
 p
re
di
ct
io
n 
er
ro
r
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Other health: Other Health, Residential, and Personal Care services include those for care provided in residential care facilities, ambulance services,
and for services provided in non-traditional settings.
Figure 11a:Actual and synthetic other health
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Figure 11b: Actual minus synthetic other health
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Figure 11c: Placebos other health
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Table 4: Donor weights for each expenditure category using the full sample
Personal
Health
Expen-
ditures
Hospital Physician
and
Clin-
ician
services
Other
prof
Dental
care
Home Nursing Drugs Durable Other
health
State
Name
Alabama - - - - - - - - - -
Arizona - - - - - - - - - -
Arkansas - - - - - - - - 0.054 -
California 0.154 - - 0.31 - 0.335 - -
Colorado - - - - - - - 0.017 - -
Connecticut - - - - - - - - - -
Delaware - - - - 0.012 - 0.357 0.023 - -
D.C - - - - - - - - 0.257 -
Florida - - - - - - - - - -
Georgia - - - - - - - - - -
Hawaii - - - 0.181 0.247 0.359 - - - 0.014
Idaho - 0.615 - - 0.163 - - 0.011 0.458 -
Illinois - - - - - -
Indiana - - - - - - - - - -
Iowa - - - - - - - - - -
Kansas - - - - - - - - - -
Kentucky - - - - - - - - - -
Louisiana - - - - 0.183 - - - - -
Maine 0.34 - - - - - 0.28 - 0.762
Maryland - - - - - - - - - -
Massachusetts - - - - - - - - -
Michigan - - - - - - - - - -
Minnesota - - - - - - 0.022
Mississippi - - - - - - - - 0.094 0.224
Montana - - 0.26 0.152 - - - 0.334 -
Nebraska - - - 0.652 - - - - - -
Nevada 0.384 0.294 0.487 - - - 0.621 - - -
New Hampshire - - - 0.015 - - - - -
New Jersey - - - - - - - - - -
New Mexico - - - - - 0.641 - - - -
New York - - - - - - - - - -
North Carolina 0.091 - - - - - - - -
North Dakota - - - - - - - - 0.126 -
Ohio - - - - - - - - - -
Oklahoma - - - - - - - - - -
Oregon - - - - - - - - - -
Pennsylvania - - - - - - - - -
Rhode Island - - - - - - - - - -
South Carolina - - - - - - - - -
South Dakota - - - - 0.086 - - - - -
Tennessee - - - - - - - - - -
Texas - - - - - - - - - -
Utah - - - - - - - - - -
Vermont 0.122 - 0.254 - - - - - - -
Virginia - - - - - - - - - -
Washington - - - - - - - - - -
West Virginia - - - - - - - - - -
Wisconsin - - - - - - - - -
Wyoming - - - - - - - - - -
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Table 5: Estimation statistics (Full sample)
Personal
Health
Expen-
ditures
Hospital Physician
and
Clin-
ician
services
Other
prof
Dental
care
Home Nursing Drugs Durable Other
health
SCM results and permutation tests-
Pre-intervention
difference (D1)
-0.14% -0.23% 0.38% 0.80% -0.14% 10.97% -0.86% -0.10% 0.02% 0.01%
Post-intervention
difference (D2)
1.66% 0.07% 2.94% 1.71% 1.88% 2.99% -3.33% -3.60% 0.59% 5.13%
DID=|D2| − |D1| 1.52% -0.15% 2.56% 0.91% 1.74% -7.98% 2.47% 3.50% 0.58% 5.11%
P-value:DID 0.04 0.34 0.02 0.08 0.30 0.02 1 1 0.46 0.04
DID rank 2 17 1 4 15 1 51 50 23 2
Table 6: Estimation statistics (Relative to Oil States)
Personal
Health
Expen-
ditures
Hospital Physician
and
Clin-
ician
services
Other
prof
Dental
care
Home Nursing Drugs Durable Other
health
SCM results and permutation tests-
Pre-intervention
difference (D1)
0.27% 0.99% 1.04% 0.93% -0.03% 10.48% -0.26% -0.13% 0.09% 0.49%
Post-intervention
difference (D2)
0.85% 0.0% 2.10% 1.14% 1.66% 3.05% -0.61% -3.29% 0.88% 2.45%
DID=|D2| − |D1| 0.58% -0.99% 1.06% 0.21% 1.63% -7.44% 0.35% 3.16% 0.79% 1.96%
P-value:DID 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 1 1 0.38 0.08
DID rank 1 1 1 1 6 1 13 13 5 1
Table 7: Estimation statistics (Pre-ACA)
Personal
Health
Expen-
ditures
Hospital Physician
and
Clin-
ician
services
Other
prof
Dental
care
Home Nursing Drugs Durable Other
health
SCM inference:permutations test-
Pre-intervention
difference (D1)
-0.14% -0.23% 0.38% 0.80% -0.14% 10.97% -0.86% -0.10% 0.02% 0.01%
Post-intervention
difference (D2)
1.91% 0.81% 3.12% 0.56% 0.91% 5.45% -5.67% -2.92% 0.87% 5.81%
DID=|D2| − |D1| 1.78% 0.58% 2.74% 0.239% 1.04% 5.5% 4.8% 2.8% 0.9% 5.8%
P-value:DID 0.04 0.2 0.02 0.16 0.34 0.02 1 0.96 0.54 0.06
DID rank 5 10 1 17 6 1 51 48 27 3
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Table 8: Estimation statistics (Medicare)
Personal
Health
Expen-
ditures
Hospital Physician
and
Clin-
ician
services
Other
prof
Dental
care
Home Nursing Drugs Durable Other
health
SCM results and permutation tests-
Pre-intervention
difference (D1)
0.81% 0.28% 3.31% 6.15% N.A 6.01% 0.07% N.A 4.54% 6.53%
Post-intervention
difference (D2)
-0.70% 0.73% -1.57% 0.11% N.A 7.62% -2.26% N.A -3.84% -0.71%
DID=|D2| − |D1| -0.11% 0.44% -1.74% -6.04% N.A 1.60% 2.19% N.A -0.71% -5.82%
P-value:DID 0.28 0.22 0.12 0.14 N.A 0.02 0.88 N.A 1 0.12
DID rank 14 11 6 7 N.A 1 44 N.A 50 6
Table 9: Estimation statistics (Medicaid)
Personal
Health
Expen-
ditures
Hospital Physician
and
Clin-
ician
services
Other
prof
Dental
care
Home Nursing Drugs Durable Other
health
SCM inference:permutations test-
Pre-intervention
difference (D1)
-0.90% 0.89% -0.69% N.A N.A 12.92% -0.79% -0.20% 1.81% -2.45%
Post-intervention
difference (D2)
-1.27% -0.50% -2.50% N.A N.A 7.31% -6.06% -14.80% -1.08% -3.16%
DID=|D2| − |D1| 0.38% -0.39% 1.81% N.A N.A -5.61% 5.27% 14.60% -0.73% 0.70%
P-value:DID 1.02 0.56 0.76 N.A N.A 0.06 1 0.98 0.42 1
DID rank 51 28 38 N.A N.A 3 50 49 21 50
Table 10: Estimation statistics (Non Medicaid and Medicare only)
Personal
Health
Expen-
ditures
Hospital Physician
and
Clin-
ician
services
Other
prof
Dental
care
Home Nursing Drugs Durable Other
health
SCM inference:permutations test-
Pre-intervention
difference (D1)
0% 0.30% 0.53% 0.88% -0.15% 8.23% -0.86% -0.73% 0.13% 0.22%
Post-intervention
difference (D2)
2.41% 0.49% 4.12% 1.87% 1.93% 18.51% -3.33% -1.94% 0.38% 5.45%
DID=|D2| − |D1| 2.41% 0.19% 3.59% 0.99% 1.79% 10.28% 2.40% 2.47% 0.25% 5.22%
P-value:DID 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.12 0.34 0.06 1 0.96 0.42 0.12
DID rank 2 5 2 6 17 3 51 48 21 6
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Figure 12: Number of healthcare establishments in Alaska relative to 1998
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12 Appendix: Definitions and relevant terms
12.1 Relevant terms
• Synthetic: Weighted average of states which best track the evolution of Alaska’s expen-
ditures before the passage of the 80th percentile rule.
• Donor pool: The states from which we construct the synthetic or alternative Alaska. In
this case, it is the rest of the U.S states plus the district of Columbia.
• Donor weights: the relative contribution of each state to the creation of the synthetic
Alaska.
• Statistically significant means that there is less than a 10% chance of finding that result
by chance.
• Placebos: The application of a “fake” intervention in other states to see if their evolution
is as pronounced as that of Alaska.
• Rank : determines where Alaska’s effect is relative to the other units.
12.2 Personal health expenditures
Total health care expenditures 20 include spending for all privately and publicly funded per-
sonal health care services and products (hospital care, physician services, nursing home care,
prescription drugs, etc.) by state of residence. Hospital spending is included and reflects the
total net revenue (gross charges less contractual adjustments, bad debts, and charity care).
Costs such as insurance program administration, research, and construction expenses are not
included in this total.
20All the health expenditure definitions can be found at Centers for Medicare and Medicaid services.
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12.3 Hospital care
Hospital Care (NAICS 622) reflects spending for all services that are provided to patients
and that are billed by the hospital. Expenditures include revenues received to cover room and
board, ancillary services such as operating room fees, services of hospital residents and interns,
inpatient pharmacy, hospital-based nursing home care, care delivered by hospital-based home
health agencies, and fees for any other services billed by the hospital. The value of hospital
services is measured by total net revenue, which equals gross patient revenues (charges) less
contractual adjustments, bad debts, and charity care. It also includes government tax ap-
propriations as well as non-patient and non-operating revenues. Excluded are expenditures
of physicians who bill independently for services delivered to patients in hospitals. These
independently-billing physicians are included in the physician sector.
12.4 Physician and Clinician Services
Physician and Clinical Services include expenditures for services provided in establishments
operated by Doctors of Medicine (M.D.) and Doctors of Osteopathy (D.O.), outpatient care
centers, plus the portion of medical laboratories services that are billed independently by the
laboratories. This category also includes services rendered by a doctor of medicine (M.D.) or
doctor of osteopathy (D.O.) in hospitals, if the physician bills independently for those services.
Clinical services provided in freestanding outpatient clinics operated by the U.S. Department
of Veterans’ Affairs, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the
U.S. Indian Health Service are also included. The establishments included in Physician and
Clinical Services are classified in NAICS 6211-Offices of Physicians, NAICS 6214-Outpatient
Care Centers, and a portion of NAICS 6215-Medical and Diagnostic Laboratories. State ex-
penditures for Physician and Clinical Services are estimated in three pieces: (1) expenditures
in private physician offices and clinics and specialty clinics;12 (2) fees of independently-billing
laboratories; and (3) expenditures in clinics operated by the U.S. Coast Guard, Department of
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Defense, Indian Health Service, and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. Expenditures in
private physician offices, clinics, and specialty clinics are based on business receipts/revenues
for taxable and tax-exempt establishments as reported in the 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997,
2002, 2007, and 2012 Economic Census. For taxable establishments (NAICS 6211 and 6214),
expenditures for non-Census years through 2006 are estimated using growth in business re-
ceipts of sole proprietorships, partnerships, and corporations.9 For non-Census years from
2008 forward, taxable expenditures are extrapolated using growth in wages and salaries paid
in Offices of Physicians (NAICS 6211) and Outpatient Care Centers (NAICS 6214).8 For tax-
exempt establishments (NAICS 6214), expenditures for non-Census years are estimated using
growth in the resident population. Estimates of expenditures for independently-billing labo-
ratories are based on business receipts for taxable establishments of Medical and Diagnostic
Laboratories (NAICS 6215) as reported in the 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and
2012 Economic Census.4 For non-Census years, laboratory expenditures are estimated using
growth in taxable physician offices and clinics expenditures. Estimates of expenditures for
clinics operated by the U.S. Coast Guard, Indian Health Service, and the U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs are estimated using state level data from the federal agencies that administer
such facilities. Data for Indian Health Service and Department of Veterans Affairs clinics are
available for each year 1980-2004. For 2005 forward, the 2004 distributions of state to total
expenditures for each type of federal clinic are held constant. For estimates of expenditures
for clinics operated by the Department of Defense, program data are available through 2005,
and the 2005 distributions by state are held constant thereafter. The separate spending es-
timates by state for physician and clinical services, independently-billing laboratories, U.S.
Coast Guard clinics, Department of Defense clinics, Indian Health Service clinics, and U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs clinics are each controlled to national totals as reported in the
NHEA. Some physicians may receive professional fees paid by hospitals. These professional
fees are included with hospital expenditures and not with physician expenditures; therefore,
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they are subtracted from the physician estimates. The estimates of professional fees by state
are based on professional fee expenses from the AHA Annual Surveys for 1980, 1985, and
1990-1993. Using AHA community hospital revenues, professional fees are interpolated and
extrapolated for intervening years and for 1994-2014.
12.5 Other Professional Services
Other Professional Services include expenditures for services provided in establishments op-
erated by health practitioners other than physicians and dentists. These professional services
include those provided by private-duty nurses, chiropractors, podiatrists, optometrists, and
physical, occupational and speech therapists, among others. These establishments are clas-
sified in NAICS 6213-Offices of Other Health Practitioners. State expenditures for Other
Professional Services are estimated in two pieces: (1) employer-based expenditures, and (2)
non-employer expenditures. Employer-based expenditures for the services of licensed profes-
sionals (such as chiropractors, optometrists, podiatrists, and independently practicing nurses)
are based on business receipts for taxable establishments of Offices of Other Health Practi-
tioners (NAICS 6213) as reported in the 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012
Economic Census.4 An estimate of optical goods sales that occur in optometrist’s offices are
removed from NAICS 6213 taxable receipts and are counted in Durable Medical Products. For
non-Census years prior to 1997, expenditures are estimated using growth in business receipts
of sole proprietorships, partnerships, and corporations.9 For non-Census years subsequent to
1997, expenditures are estimated using growth in wages and salaries paid in Offices of Other
Health Practitioners. Non-employer expenditures for Other Professional Services are based
on data from the Census Bureau’s Non-employer Statistics program for 1997 through 2013.13
For years prior to 1997, the 1997 distributions of state non-employer expenditures to total
expenditures are held constant. For 2014, non-employer expenditures are estimated using the
growth in aggregate non-employer expenditures of Other Professional Services. Separately,
45
employer and non-employer-based spending estimates by state for Other Professional Services
are controlled to national totals as reported in the NHEA.
12.6 Dental Care
Dental Services include expenditures for services provided in establishments operated by a
Doctor of Dental Medicine (D.M.D.), Doctor of Dental Surgery (D.D.S.), or Doctor of Den-
tal Science (D.D.Sc.). These establishments are classified as NAICS 6212-Offices of Dentists.
State expenditures for Offices of Dentists are based on business receipts for taxable estab-
lishments as reported in the 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012 Economic
Census.4 For non-Census years before 2013, expenditures are estimated using growth in busi-
ness receipts of sole proprietorships, partnerships, and corporations. For 2013 and 2014,
expenditures are estimated using growth in wages and salaries paid in dental establishments.8
Finally, the dental spending estimates by state are controlled to national totals as reported in
the NHEA.
12.7 Home Care
Home Health Care services include expenditures for medical care services provided in the
home by freestanding home health agencies (HHAs) that are classified in NAICS 6216-Home
Health Care Services. The HHAs included in this category are private sector establishments
primarily engaged in providing skilled nursing services in the home along with a range of
the following: personal care services; homemaker and companion services; physical therapy;
medical social services; medications; medical equipment and supplies; counseling; 24-hour
home care; occupation and vocational therapy; dietary and nutritional services; speech ther-
apy; audiology; and high-tech care, such as intravenous therapy. Medical equipment sales or
rentals not billed through HHAs and non-medical types of home care (e.g., Meals on Wheels,
chore-worker services, friendly visits, or other custodial services) are excluded. Also excluded
46
are hospital-based home health agencies. State expenditures for Home Health Care services
are estimated in two pieces: (1) employer-based expenditures, and (2) non-employer expendi-
tures. Employer-based expenditures for private freestanding home health agencies are based
on business receipts/revenues for taxable and tax-exempt establishments as reported in the
1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012 Economic Census. Because government-supplied home
health services are not surveyed by the Economic Census, an add-on is developed for estimates
of government-owned home health agencies by state using Medicare statistical data. For non-
Census years prior to 1992, employer-based home health expenditures by state are estimated
using growth in Medicare and Medicaid home health spending. For non-Census years subse-
quent to 1992 expenditures are estimated using growth in private wages and salaries paid by
home health care establishments. Non-employer expenditures for Home Health Care services
are based on data from the Census Bureau’s Non-employer Statistics program for 1997 through
2014. For years prior to 1997, the distributions of state non-employer expenditures to total ex-
penditures are held constant at the 1997 level. Separately, employer and non-employer-based
spending estimates by state for Home Health Care Services are controlled to national totals
as reported in the NHEA.
12.8 Nursing
Expenditures for Nursing Care Facilities and Continuing Care Retirement Communities in-
clude spending for inpatient nursing care services, rehabilitative services, and continuous per-
sonal care services to persons requiring nursing care that are provided in freestanding nursing
home facilities. These establishments are classified in NAICS 6231-Nursing Care Facilities and
NAICS 623311-Continuing Care Retirement Communities with on-site nursing care facilities.
These services are generally provided for an extended period of time by registered or licensed
practical nurses and other staff. Expenditures for care received in state and local government
facilities and nursing facilities operated by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs are also
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included. Excluded are nursing home services provided in long-term care units of hospitals.
State expenditures for Nursing Care Facilities and Continuing Care Retirement Communities
are estimated in three pieces: (1) private freestanding nursing care facilities and continuing
care retirement communities; (2) state and local government nursing homes; and (3) nursing
homes operated by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.
Expenditures for private freestanding nursing care facilities (NAICS 6231) and continu-
ing care retirement communities (NAICS 623311) are based on business receipts/revenues for
taxable and non-taxable establishments as reported in the 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002,
2007, and 2012 Economic Census.4 For non-Census years, nursing home expenditures by state
are estimated using growth in wages and salaries paid in private nursing home establishments.
For all years 1980-2014, expenditures for state and local government-owned nursing homes are
estimated by inflating wages and salaries paid in state and local nursing home establishments
using the ratio of private nursing home revenues to private nursing home wages and salaries.
Expenditures for nursing homes operated by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA)
are estimated using state level data furnished by the DVA for each year 1980-2014. Separately,
spending estimates by state for private freestanding nursing care facilities and continuing care
retirement communities, state and local government nursing homes, and nursing homes oper-
ated by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs are controlled to national totals as reported in
the NHEA. Prescription Drugs and Other Non-Durable Medical Products Prescription Drugs
include expenditures for the “retail” sales of human-use dosage-form drugs, biological drugs,
and diagnostic products that are available only by a prescription. Other Non-Durable Medi-
cal Products include expenditures for the “retail” sales of non-prescription drugs and medical
sundries. State expenditures for Prescription Drugs and Other Non-Durable Medical Prod-
ucts are estimated in two pieces: (1) expenditures for prescription drugs, and (2) expenditures
for other non-durable medical products (non-prescription medicines and sundries). For both
pieces, expenditures are based on retail sales data as reported in the 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992,
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1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012 Census of Retail Trade, Merchandise Line Sales. Expenditures
for prescription drugs in non-Census years are estimated using data from the IMS Health Re-
tail Prescription Method of Payment Report.11 Expenditures for other non-durable medical
products in non-Census years are estimated using growth in personal income per capita. Sep-
arately, spending estimates by state for Prescription Drugs and Other Non-Durable Medical
Products are controlled to national totals as reported in the NHEA.
12.9 Prescription drugs
Prescription Drugs include expenditures for the “retail” sales of human-use dosage-form drugs,
biological drugs, and diagnostic products that are available only by a prescription. Other Non-
Durable Medical Products include expenditures for the “retail” sales of non-prescription drugs
and medical sundries. State expenditures for Prescription Drugs and Other Non-Durable Med-
ical Products are estimated in two pieces: (1) expenditures for prescription drugs, and (2)
expenditures for other non-durable medical products (non-prescription medicines and sun-
dries). For both pieces, expenditures are based on retail sales data as reported in the 1977,
1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012 Census of Retail Trade, Merchandise Line Sales.
Expenditures for prescription drugs in non-Census years are estimated using data from the
IMS Health Retail Prescription Method of Payment Report.11 Expenditures for other non-
durable medical products in non-Census years are estimated using growth in personal income
per capita. Separately, spending estimates by state for Prescription Drugs and Other Non-
Durable Medical Products are controlled to national totals as reported in the NHEA. Durable
Medical
12.10 Durable Medical Products
Durable Medical Products include expenditures for the “retail” sales of items such as contact
lenses, eyeglasses and other ophthalmic products, surgical and orthopedic products, hearing
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aids, wheelchairs, and medical equipment rentals.
State expenditures for Durable Medical Products are estimated in two pieces: (1) durable
goods sold in retail outlets, excluding those sold in Offices of Optometrists, and (2) expen-
ditures for optical goods sold in Offices of Optometrists (NAICS 621320). Expenditures for
durable goods sold in retail outlets, excluding those sold in Offices of Optometrists, are based
on retail sales of optical goods as reported in the 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007,
and 2012 Census of Retail Trade, Merchandise Line Sales. Expenditures for optical goods
sold in Offices of Optometrists (NAICS 621320) are based on business receipts for taxable
establishments as reported in the 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012 Eco-
nomic Census. For Census years, expenditures by state for durable goods sold in both retail
and non-retail establishments are summed. For non-Census years, these expenditures are in-
terpolated and extrapolated using growth in per capita personal income. Finally, spending
estimates for Durable Medical Products by state are controlled to national totals as reported
in the NHEA.
12.11 Other Health, Residential, and Personal Care
Other Health, Residential, and Personal Care services include those for care provided in resi-
dential care facilities, ambulance services, and for services provided in non-traditional settings.
State expenditures for Other Health, Residential, and Personal Care services are estimated
in three pieces: (1) private residential facilities for the intellectually disabled and residen-
tial mental health and substance abuse facilities, as classified in NAICS 62321-Residential
Facilities for the Intellectually Disabled, and NAICS 62322-Residential Mental Health and
Substance Abuse Facilities; (2) private expenditures for ambulance services, as classified in
NAICS 62191-Ambulance Services; and (3) services provided in non-traditional settings. Pri-
vate spending by Residential Facilities for the Intellectually Disabled (NAICS 62321), and
Residential Mental Health and Substance Abuse Facilities (NAICS 62322) are based on busi-
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ness receipts/revenues for taxable and tax-exempt establishments as reported in the 1997,
2002, 2007, and 2012 Economic Census.4 For non-Census years subsequent to 1990, expen-
ditures by state are estimated using growth in wages and salaries paid in private residential
establishments.8 For non-Census years prior to 1990, expenditures by state are estimated
using the distribution of state to total spending for Nursing Care Facilities and Continuing
Care Retirement Communities. Private spending by Ambulance Services (NAICS 62191) are
based on business receipts/revenues for taxable and tax-exempt establishments as reported in
the 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012 Economic Census.4 For non-Census years subsequent to 1990,
expenditures by state are estimated using growth in wages and salaries paid for private am-
bulance providers.8 For non-Census years prior to 1990, expenditures by state are estimated
using the distribution of state to total spending for Medicare ambulance services. Services
provided in non-traditional settings include spending for worksite healthcare, school health,
and other types of miscellaneous care funded by federal or state programs. The largest com-
ponent of spending in this category is home and community-based waivers under the Medicaid
program. Under this program, states may apply for waivers of some of the statutory provisions
in order to provide care to beneficiaries who would otherwise require long-term inpatient care
in a hospital or nursing home. Examples of types of services provided are habilitation, respite
care, and environmental modifications. This care is frequently delivered in community centers,
senior citizen centers and through home visits by various kinds of medical and non-medical
personnel. Expenditures by state for this program are developed using data from CMS-64
reports that are filed by state Medicaid agencies for all years 1980-2014. For other types of
funding classified in Other Health, Residential, and Personal Care, distributions by state are
obtained using data from the CMS-64’s and other program funding. Medicaid make up the
majority of this funding but other examples include care funded by the Indian Health Service,
Maternal and Child Health Bureau, Department of Veterans Affairs, Children’s Health Insur-
ance Program, school health programs, worksite healthcare, and Substance Abuse and Mental
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Health Services Administration. Separately, spending estimates by state for residential care
facilities, ambulance services, and for care provided in non-traditional settings are summed
and controlled to national totals as reported in the NHEA.
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